magazine issue 11 2015 / Issue 28

Can you nonbelieve it: What happens when you do not believe in your memories?

• written by Jianqin Wang, Henry Otgaar, Mark Howe, Tom Smeets & Harald Merckelbach
• edited by Lieke Braadbaart

Nonbelieved memories are fascinating, if only because the bulk of studies focusing on memory examine believed memories: memories of events for which people also believe that the event occurred (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004). While various ideas about memory suggest that memories are typically believed to be true (e.g., James, 1890/1950; Brewer, 1996), it is only recently that memory researchers have started to investigate the possibility that memory might exist without accompanying belief.

Are Nonbelieved Memories Really Rare?

In the first systematic study looking into nonbelieved memories, the frequency and characteristics of nonbelieved memories were surveyed. Almost 25% of the 1593 participants reported to have experienced a nonbelieved memory (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010). For example, one participant recollected that he had seen a dinosaur although the belief in the event had vanished. Another person reported a childhood memory of a car accident, but many years later discovered that it actually happened to his brother. Memory characteristics, such as visual details, of nonbelieved memories were also examined. Nonbelieved memories did not differ from believed memories in terms of visual characteristics, clarity, richness, and feeling of reliving, which may explain why nonbelieved memories “feel” so authentic.  

Some researchers argued that studies like the one of Mazzoni and colleagues (2010) rely on directly asking participants about a typical experience and in this way reveal the purpose of the inquiry. If participants know what the researcher is interested in, then that can artificially inflate the rate of nonbelieved memories. In order to understand the nature and frequency of nonbelieved memories in everyday autobiographical memory, Scoboria and Talarico (2013) used an indirect cueing method, without artificially drawing participants’ attention to nonbelieved memories. Participants were asked to recall events from different ages and then rated the degree of event recollections ( memory) and belief in the occurrence of events (belief) on 1-8 point scales. Surprisingly, with this indirect cueing procedure, only 3% to 6% of the events recalled were nonbelieved memories, a much lower rate than the 25% reported by Mazzoni et al. (2010).